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ARTICLES
AN "OTHER" CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVE ON
LAWRENCE V. TEXAS
VICTOR C. ROMEROt
I. GAYS, GOD, AND CAESAR
The introduction to the seminal compendium, Christian
Perspectives on Legal Thought,1 asks the following question:
"What does it mean in America today to say that Jesus, rather
than Caesar, is Lord?'' 2  Put slightly differently, if Caesar
represents the power, glory, and influence of man and the secular
world, how should people who claim to follow Jesus rather than
Caesar conduct themselves in the public sphere? As a Christian
and a teacher of constitutional law, I would like to apply that
question to an analysis of the American public's reaction to
recent events, beginning with the Supreme Court's 2003 decision
in Lawrence v. Texas,3 the case outlawing prohibitions against
same-sex activity, and ending with the 2005 referenda that
resulted in limiting the definition of marriage to a union between
a man and woman in eighteen states.
This essay will explore whether this public reaction, fueled
in large part by Christians, reflects placing Jesus rather than the
world at the center of worship and concern. Although I can claim
no expertise in Christian theology, I wonder whether a more
faithful application of Jesus's teachings on social justice would
have led to a different interpretation, one that embraces
t Associate Dean for Academic Affairs & Maureen B. Cavanaugh Research
Professor, Penn State University. I thank Phil McConnaughay for his support of this
and many other projects; my many colleagues for their input and conversations
regarding this subject, especially Carlos Ball and Rob Vischer, for insightful
comments on an earlier draft; and, most importantly, I thank my wife, Corie, my
children, Ryan and Julia, and my family in the Philippines for their constant love
and care.
' CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT xvii-xxii (Michael W.
McConnell, Robert F. Cochran, Jr. & Angela C. Carmella eds., 2001).
2 Id. at xx.
3 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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Lawrence and rejects States' attempts to narrowly define families
in ways that mirror Levitical teaching.4 In the spirit of inquiry,
reconciliation, and friendly debate, I humbly offer these thoughts
to fellow Christians who may disagree, concerned that the
prevailing narrative on these events reflects but one view of
Christianity.5
II. IN THE BEGINNING WERE HARDWICK AND EVANS 6
Before the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Lawrence,
American constitutional law on the rights of gays and lesbians
was unsettled. On the one hand, Bowers v. Hardwick7 stood for
the proposition that there was no substantive due process right
to engage in same-sex sodomy and that therefore, the state of
Georgia was allowed to criminalize it.8 On the other, Romer v.
Evans9 held that the state of Colorado could not amend its
constitution to disallow gays and lesbians from petitioning
authorities to enact antidiscrimination laws. 10  Because
Hardwick was adjudicated on due process grounds while Evans
was an equal protection case, the Court's view on future gay
rights cases was decidedly murky, but perhaps what the justices
anticipated.1" As William Eskridge explains, "[t]his lack of
4 See, e.g., Leviticus 18:22, 20:13 (New American) (discussing the sinfulness of
same-sex activity under Old Testament law).
5 I am reminded of the example of civil rights activist Bob Moses who, knowing
he could not change hearts himself, understood nonetheless that he could be a
catalyst for change: 'Moses tried to be a catalyst-without being the determining
force-of the other person's decision to act. He understood that as an outsider he
could never badger the reluctant participant." CHARLES MARSH, THE BELOVED
COMMUNITY: How FAITH SHAPES SOCIAL JUSTICE, FROM THE CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT TO TODAY 104 (2005). It is in this spirit that I offer these thoughts, ever
mindful that I may be wrong.
6 Although these cases are more popularly called Bowers and Romer,
respectively, I think it more appropriate to highlight the names of the gay
petitioners whose rights were at issue.
7 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
8 Id. at 189-91.
9 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
10 Id. at 626-27.
11 It is also worth noting that the reach of the proposed Amendment 2 in Evans
extended beyond the sexual conduct discussed in Hardwick to encompass same-sex
orientation. The amendment read:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian or Bisexual
Orientation. Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or
departments, nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities
or school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation,
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authoritative guidance is probably what the Supreme Court
expected after Evans: ... courts would struggle with issues of
sexual orientation discrimination on a case-by-case basis, less
constrained by Supreme Court precedent because of the
Hardwick versus Evans choice now available." 12  Thus, in the
interim between 1996, when Evans was decided, and 2003, when
Lawrence was handed down, there was no clear answer to the
issue of when government discrimination based on sexual
orientation was constitutionally permissible. Although raising
other thorny issues, the Court reconciled the apparent Hardwick-
Evans conflict by overruling Hardwick in Lawrence, discussed
more fully below.
III. THE FLOOD: LAWRENCE AND THE BACKLASH
The facts of Lawrence are worth a brief mention here, if only
because of the bizarre way in which the case came into being.13
On one fall evening in 1998, John Lawrence and Tyron Garner
were doing what millions of other couples do every day in
America-they were having sex in their home. What happened
next was less commonplace. Police broke into their apartment,
interrupting their intimate activity. Unbeknownst to them, a
neighbor had called the police to the Lawrence-Garner
household, reporting a weapons violation. While the neighbor
was later charged with filing a false report, Lawrence and
Garner were arrested pursuant to a Texas statute that
criminalized sex between members of the same gender as
"deviate sexual intercourse." 14 At the time of the arrest, Texas
ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation,
conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis
of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority
status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination.
Id. at 624 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
12 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE
CLOSET 172 (1999).
13 For more on the murky facts of Lawrence, see generally Dale Carpenter, The
Unknown Past of Lawrence v. Texas, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1464 (2004). The facts of
Hardwick are similarly curious: Unbeknownst to Hardwick, a police officer was
given permission to enter his home pursuant to what turned out to be a faulty arrest
warrant. See JOYCE MURDOCH & DEB PRICE, COURTING JUSTICE: GAY MEN AND
LESBIANS V. THE SUPREME COURT 278-79 (2001).
14 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (Vernon 2003), invalidated by Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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was but one of a handful of states15 that criminalized same-sex
activity. After pleading guilty to the act, the couple challenged
their convictions in the Texas state courts, claiming that the law
violated their federal constitutional rights.16  Perhaps not
surprisingly, given the Hardwick precedent, the Texas courts
upheld their convictions. 17
In a 6-to-3 decision, the Supreme Court reversed. While
Justice Kennedy penned the majority opinion and Justice
O'Connor concurred in the judgment, the same six justices who
struck down Colorado Amendment 2 in Evans voted in the
plaintiffs' favor. The Kennedy majority explicitly chose to
overrule Hardwick, noting that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment was broad enough to protect the
consensual, private sexual activity of adults, whether the
partners are of the same or opposite sex.'8 After painstakingly
reviewing the history of anti-sodomy statutes generally (they did
not discriminate against same-gender couples) and the Texas
criminal law in particular (it was only recently enacted,
apparently to target same-gender couples), Kennedy invoked the
Court's decisions in Planned Parenthood v. Casey19 and Evans as
controlling precedents-Planned Parenthood, to emphasize the
Due Process Clause's substantive protection of intimate, personal
decisions, and Evans to highlight the Court's rejection of animus-
based discrimination based on sexual orientation. 20 Notwith-
standing Justice Scalia's invocation of stare decisis, 21 the
Kennedy majority saw fit to overturn Hardwick.22
From a purely constitutional law perspective, Lawrence was
a long time coming, and indeed, Hardwick was arguably
15 The other states which had similar laws at the time included Idaho,
Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 581 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
16 Id. at 563 (majority opinion).
17 Id.
18 Id. at 573-75.
19 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
20 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573-75.
21 Id. at 586-87 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
22 Justice O'Connor's concurrence is worth noting, if only because she had joined
the majority in Hardwick to uphold the Georgia statute, yet now voted to overturn
the Texas one not on due process, but equal protection grounds. Id. at 579, 581-85
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Addressing Kennedy's concern that using the Equal
Protection Clause might prompt the creation of neutral anti-sodomy laws, O'Connor
believed that heterosexuals would not support such a movement. Id. at 584-85.
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incorrectly decided in the first place because one of the justices in
the original 5-to-4 majority later went public, acknowledging his
error. In his memoir of Justice Lewis Powell, John Jeffries notes
that the Justice struggled mightily with the issue of same-sex
activity, afraid of going down the slippery slope of affording what
he viewed to be extra-constitutional rights to gays and lesbians,
yet uncomfortable with the idea of sending them to jail for
private sexual activity.23  Powell ended up siding with the
majority, but a few months later, conceded that he had likely
erred in Hardwick.24 Given Powell's change of heart and the
6-to-3 vote in Evans, it is perhaps unsurprising that Lawrence
overruled Hardwick, flatly ignoring the doctrine of stare decisis.
Indeed, if, per the Court's 1965 ruling in Griswold v.
Connecticut,25 one is allowed to engage in consensual, private,
non-procreative sex (including non-marital sex per Eisenstadt v.
Baird26), is it much of a stretch to conclude that same-gender
partners engaged in similar activity should not be subject to
criminal prosecution? Put differently, if a broad reading of the
Court's forty-odd-year-old decisions in Griswold and Eisenstadt
could comfortably be extended to protect the privacy interests of
same-gender partners, then arguably, the Lawrence decision is
long past due. More importantly, our civic culture does not care
about wasting scarce prosecutorial resources going after adult
citizens having consensual sex in the privacy of their homes, our
religious views regarding premarital and extramarital sex
notwithstanding. In sum, one could easily view Lawrence as
largely predictable, given both the development of our
constitutional law and society's general indifference to policing
private, consensual sexual activity between adults.
And yet, from the perspective of religious conservatives, the
Lawrence decision was viewed as "an earthquake at the Supreme
Court,"27 as Esther Kaplan observes. Justice Scalia's dissent,
wherein he warned that the majority's ruling would call into
question "[s]tate laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult
incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication,
23 JOHN C. JEFFRIES JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 530 (2001).
24 Id.
25 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
26 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
27 ESTHER KAPLAN, WITH GOD ON THEIR SIDE: GEORGE W. BUSH AND THE
CHRISTIAN RIGHT 155 (2004).
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bestiality, and obscenity,"28 was widely circulated among the
religious right, who soon saw the case as less about the
decriminalization of sexual conduct and more about the threat to
the established social order. Kaplan reports that Christian
groups that traditionally were very difficult to organize suddenly
found an issue they could all embrace-protecting the institution
of marriage from the assault of an activist court. 29 Some of the
rhetoric was particularly strong. The group Concerned Women
for America opined that, with Lawrence, the Court had
dismantled "3,000 years of Judeo-Christian-based law," and
prominent radio evangelist James Dobson declared that the fight
against gay marriage would be "our D-Day, or Gettysburg or
Stalingrad."30 It was this framing of Lawrence as an attack by
liberal, activist judges 31 on the Judeo-Christian tradition of
marriage (rather than as the long-overdue decriminalization of
same-sex sodomy) that helped convince voters in thirteen states
in 2004 to amend their constitutions, limiting the definition of
marriage to a union between a man and woman. 32
28 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 590 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
29 KAPLAN, supra note 27, at 157.
30 Id. at 156.
31 At the state and local levels, Massachusetts began a mini-revolution of sorts
around the same time as Lawrence by finding prohibitions against gay marriage
unconstitutional under its own laws. See Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802
N.E.2d 565, 572 (Mass. 2004) (holding that the proposed law creating separate civil
unions for same-gender couples violated equal protection guarantees under the state
constitution); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003)
(finding state law limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples unconstitutional under
Massachusetts equal protection guarantees). San Francisco, New Paltz, and a host of
other cities soon followed suit. See How Issue Evolved in State, Nation: Gay
Marriage Ruling, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 5, 2004, at A15. It may be that these events
had more of an impact on the issue of gay marriage at the state level than Lawrence,
especially vis-a-vis the thirteen states that decided to enact marriage amendments
by the end of 2005, infra note 32, but because it was issued by the highest federal
court in the land, Lawrence arguably was the catalyst that triggered a nationwide
debate on the issue of gay marriage.
32 See, e.g., Group Drops Bid To Ban Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29,
2005, at A24. Eleven of the thirteen passed these amendments in November 2004:
Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Ohio, Oregon, and Utah. See Voters Pass All 11 Bans on Gay Marriage,
MSNBC.com, Nov. 3, 2004, http://msnbc.msn.com/id/6383353/. Missouri and
Louisiana voters approved similar laws in August and September of 2004,
respectively. See Monica Davey, Missourians Back Amendment Barring Gay
Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2004, at A13; Gay-Marriage Ban Passes in Louisiana,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2004, § 1 at 24. For a detailed comparison of the racist
backlash following Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), with the
growing anti-gay rights backlash of recent years, see Carlos A. Ball, The Backlash
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A primary (and well-known) argument raised by
conservative Christians is that the Bible speaks against same-sex
activity and reserves the sacrament of marriage to opposite-sex
couples. In 1986, then-Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger (now Pope
Benedict XVI) outlined the Catholic Church's opposition to same-
sex relations, citing Genesis 3 (Adam and Eve, man and woman,
created in the image of God) and 19:1-11 (denouncing the
homosexuality of the Sodomites), Leviticus 18:22 and 20:13
(excluding from the Chosen People those who engage in
homosexual acts), 1 Corinthians 6:9 (listing homosexuals as
among those who shall not enter God's kingdom), Romans 1:18-
32 (citing homosexual activity as an example of the blindness
that has overcome humanity), and 1 Timothy 1, especially verse
10, which he notes, "explicitly names as sinners those who
engage in homosexual acts."33 Thus, to the extent that our laws
reflect our Christian morality, criminalizing same-sex activity
and prohibiting same-gender marriages are an attempt to
conform our law to God's, so the argument goes. After all, the
Decalogue's "Thou shalt not kill" finds its way into American
state and federal law without controversy. Why then, through
Lawrence, should unappointed federal judges be allowed to
thwart the will of a God-fearing public (both within and without
Texas) by, first, explicitly sanctioning same-sex relations
prohibited by sacred texts and second, by implicitly condoning
same-gender marriage? 34
Thesis and Same-Sex Marriage: Learning from Brown v. Board of Education and its
Aftermath, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1493 (2006).
33 Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on
the Pastoral Care of Homosexual Persons, in HOMOSEXUALITY IN THE CHURCH: BOTH
SIDES OF THE DEBATE 39, 41 (Jeffrey S. Siker ed., 1994). At the time of his writing,
Ratzinger was the Prefect of the Catholic Church's Congregation for the Doctrine of
the Faith, which is responsible for stating the Church's official doctrine. See
Biography of His Holiness Pope Benedict XVI, http://www.vatican.va
/holy-father/benedictxvi/biography/documents/hf ben-xvi bio_20050419_short-biog
raphyen.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2006).
34 Although the Kennedy and O'Connor opinions take pains to say that the issue
before the Lawrence court was not same-gender marriage, there is strength to
Scalia's claim that the majority's decision rests on a conception of morality different
from that of the Texas legislature's and that, under the rational basis test, the Court
may not substitute its judgment for that of the state's duly-elected legislators. Put
differently, the law may be "uncommonly silly" as Justice Thomas noted in dissent,
but, under his view, the proper legal recourse is to seek political, not judicial,
redress. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 605 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 527 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
As a matter of constitutional interpretation, I read the Court's "rational basis" cases
2006)
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As I explain in the next section, I believe a strong argument
can be made that the more persuasive reading of Lawrence from
a Christian perspective is one that affirms both its explicit (same-
sex relations may not be criminalized) and implicit (same-gender
marriage promotes equality) messages.
IV. WHAT WOULD JESUS Do?: LOVING LAWRENCE
From a purely textual perspective, it is clear that at least
some of the texts that Ratzinger cites cast a negative view on
same-gender sexual relations. Noted theologian Walter Wink
concedes that "[t]he Bible quite clearly takes a negative view of
homosexual activity," although he believes that, for most
Christian churches, the Bible is not the final word.35 He notes
that, in reality, modern churches have selectively invoked the
Bible's edicts, choosing to follow some of its teachings (e.g.,
rejecting adultery), while ignoring others (e.g., permitting
slavery). 36 In the realm of sexual activity, the Bible clearly
forbids sexual intercourse during a woman's period as well as
many other non-procreative sex acts,3 7 and yet, Wink argues,
many modern Christians simply dismiss these passages as
culturally-bound.38 The challenge for each person, then, is to
interpret the Bible in light of a principle that will resist the
winds of change and culture.
as allowing for greater judicial scrutiny-in Gerald Gunther's analysis, rational
basis with "bite"-where the evidence suggests irrational discrimination or animus.
See Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:
A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 18-20 (1972). Lawrence
and Evans reflect this understanding.
35 See Walter Wink, Homosexuality and the Bible, http://www.soulforce.org/
article/homosexuality-bible-walter-wink (last visited Jan. 11, 2006). This essay is
particularly interesting because Wink challenges the interpretation that Ratzinger
(and others) give to some of the Bible's Old Testament passages. For instance, Wink
views the attempted gang rape by the Sodomites in Genesis 19:1-29 as a case of
"heterosexual males intent on humiliating strangers by treating them 'like women,'
thus demasculinizing them." Id. Ratzinger takes the story more literally, as
condemning homosexual activity. See supra text accompanying note 33.
36 Wink, supra note 35.
37 Conservative columnist Andrew Sullivan explores the cultural
understandings regarding non-procreative sexual activity in a recent article, noting
that the roots against sodomy appeared in the Middle Age writings of monk Peter
Damien, who argued that the beginning of sexual rebellion against God is "'when
someone spills semen outside the place specified for this.'" See Andrew Sullivan, We
Are All Sodomites Now, http://www.andrewsullivan.com/main-article.php?
artnum=20030327 (last visited Jan. 11, 2006).
38 Wink, supra note 35.
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For Christians, the key principle should be the love and
example of Jesus Christ. Jesus's "love ethic," as Wink calls it,
does not exploit and does not dominate; instead, it is
"responsible, mutual, caring, and loving."39 A Christian code of
sexual ethics, therefore, should not place opposite-sex relations
above same-sex ones, if the sex act involves an expression of
genuine love between two persons; indeed, the four gospels
contain not a word about Jesus's views of same-sex
relationships, 40 but many statements about how we are required
to care for each other. In what some consider to be the most
challenging of Jesus's parables, Christ separates the "sheep"
from the "goats," lifting up his faithful servants for their
commitment to social justice-feeding the hungry, clothing the
naked, welcoming the stranger, and visiting the prisoner-while
condemning to eternal fire those who have ignored the plight of
the oppressed. 41
Like Jesus's love ethic, Lawrence echoes the majority's
commitment to societal outsiders. Justice Kennedy's majority
opinion defines the substantive bounds of due process to set a
baseline freedom that all enjoy-a freedom not to be incarcerated
for private, consensual, sexual activity. Employing Equal
Protection analysis, Justice O'Connor's concurrence reaches the
same result, using language that parallels Christ's charge that
we care for the least among us when she writes, "The Texas
sodomy statute subjects homosexuals to 'a lifelong penalty and
stigma. A legislative classification that threatens the creation of
an underclass... cannot be reconciled with' the Equal Protection
Clause."42 To the extent that our Constitution can be interpreted
to reflect Christ's commitment to social justice, Lawrence is
entirely consistent with Christianity.
Two objections from the Christian right become readily
apparent. First, critics might contend that Jesus's love ethic,
39 Id.
40 See John J. McNeill, Homosexuality: Challenging the Church To Grow, in
HOMOSEXUALITY IN THE CHURCH: BOTH SIDES OF THE DEBATE, supra note 33, at 56.
41 See Matthew 25:31-46 (New American).
42 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 584 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(omission in original) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 239 (1982) (Powell, J.,
concurring)). It is fitting that O'Connor thought to analogize the plight of the
Lawrence plaintiffs to the noncitizens in Plyler, a case in which the Court found that
undocumented children could not be denied the basic right to a free public primary
and secondary education. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230.
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while demanding that we love every person, would
simultaneously require that we condemn their sinful behavior.
And second, some might wonder whether the true danger implicit
in the Lawrence decision is the threat to the traditional husband-
and-wife conception of marriage embraced by the majority of
Christians.
The first objection is a version of the old adage, "We must
love the sinner, but hate the sin." To wit, Jesus's love ethic
would require that we condemn the practice of same-gender sex
while loving the gay or lesbian person. Same-sex activity should
be condemned because it constitutes self-destructive behavior,
like drug abuse or consensual polygamy, the argument goes.
Thus, Christians are required to show their love to their gay and
lesbian kin by gently reminding them of the sinfulness of their
behaviors. Some Christians believe that the self-destructive
nature of this act may be proven not just because most people
(and not just Christians) find homosexual practices immoral even
though support for gay civil rights has grown, 43 but also because
current scientific evidence, although unwilling to label
homosexuality a psychological disorder, does not support the
view that its practices are normatively desirable. As Christian
psychologists Stanton Jones and Mark Yarhouse argue, "[tihe
removal of a behavioral pattern from a list of designated
psychopathologies... bears no necessary logical relation to
endorsement of that pattern as healthy, whole, or a normal
variant."44 While acknowledging that societal homophobia may
partially explain the data, Jones and Yarhouse point to the high
incidence of personal distress and maladaptiveness of gays and
lesbians as evidence of the undesirable nature of such conduct. 45
43 "[S]urveys of public opinion have continued to show for over two decades that
almost 80 percent of the general public has continued to view all instances of
homosexual behavior as immoral, even while support for equal civil rights for
homosexuals has grown." Stanton L. Jones and Mark A. Yarhouse, The Use, Misuse,
and Abuse of Science in the Ecclesiastical Homosexuality Debates, in
HOMOSEXUALITY, SCIENCE, AND THE "PLAIN SENSE" OF SCRIPTURE 107 (David L.
Balch ed., 2000).
44 Id. at 84.
45 Id. at 107-12. They conclude, "[t]he evidence cited above falls far short of a
convincing case that homosexuality in itself constitutes a psychopathological
condition. The evidence also suggests that one would be on shaky grounds in
proclaiming that there is no evidence that homosexuality is anything other than a
healthy, normal lifestyle variant." Id. at 112.
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I agree with Stanton and Jones, but only to the extent that
they describe a self-inflicted harm that grows out of sexual
idolatry. Hence, I believe that Jesus would condemn self-
indulgent sexual behavior that commodifies persons, but that he
would also lift up sexual activity that expresses genuine love
between two committed individuals. Put differently, a Christian
love ethic embraces sexual love and not lust, regardless of the
gender of the actors. From the Song of Songs, a celebration of
sexual love between a husband and a wife,46 to Paul's Letter to
the Romans, in which he condemns lustful behavior,47 the Bible
embraces sexual expression within the bounds of an exclusive,
loving relationship while rejecting promiscuous, addictive,
idolatrous sex. Jesus warned, 'You have heard that it was said,
'You shall not commit adultery.' But I say to you, everyone who
looks at a woman with lust has already committed adultery with
her in his heart."48  But why presume that those engaged in
same-sex activity are any more lustful than those engaged in
opposite-sex activity? Society's indifference to legally condem-
ning premarital and extramarital sex among heterosexuals belies
this assumption. The ready availability of divorce in modern
America also undercuts this moral claim. In short, a Christian
sexual ethic should embrace sexual love 49 and reject lust,
46 Song of Songs 4:1-7, 5:10-16 (describing a man and a woman's unabashed
excitement upon seeing the other's naked bodies).
47 Romans 1:18-32. In his careful examination of the original Greek text of
Romans 1:24-27, Lutheran professor David E. Fredrickson explains, "[I]t is not
Paul's interest to condemn homosexuality but to highlight sexual passion.. . , which
is uniform with respect to the gender of the desired object. Paul tells the story of
humans who have been overwhelmed by passion. The capacity.., for acquiring
what they believe to be good has been inflamed, and so they are in a constant state
of frustration, unable to be sated. Their error ... was to exchange normal use for
erotic love." David E. Fredrickson, Natural and Unnatural Use in Romans 1:24-2 7:
Paul and the Philosophic Critique of Eros, in HOMOSEXUALITY, SCIENCE, AND THE
"PLAIN SENSE" OF SCRIPTURE, supra note 43, at 215.
48 Matthew 5:27-28.
49 For a detailed and persuasive moral argument for gay marriage and adoption
from a philosophical perspective, see generally CARLOS A. BALL, THE MORALITY OF
GAY RIGHTS (2003). Although not grounded in Christian thought, the book embraces
a moral liberalism that balances traditional liberalism's concern for individual
autonomy against the feminist recognition that human beings live in community.
Ball writes, "[r]ather than viewing others primarily as a threat to autonomy, moral
liberalism sees autonomy as emanating largely from our relationships with and our
dependencies on others." Id. at 76. This conception of moral liberalism shares much
with the ideal of community and interdependence lived out by the early Christians
in the New Testament book of Acts. See, e.g., Acts 2:44-45 ("All who believed were
20061
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whether between a man and a man, a woman and a woman, or
between a man and a woman.
The second objection worries about the threat that Lawrence
and the so-called "gay rights agenda" pose to the traditional
conception of marriage. As a purely legal matter, both Kennedy
and O'Connor are quick to limit their opinions to the narrow
issue of whether same-sex activity may be criminalized;
Lawrence says nothing about the legality of same-gender
marriages. Put differently, the Lawrence majority made no
statement either endorsing or opposing gay marriage; it simply
stated that individuals may not be put into prison for engaging in
sex with others of the same gender. To those quick either to
dismiss this defense as legal sophistry or to be concerned about
the broader implications of the majority's logic as was Scalia, we
must ask the question why the traditional definition is to be
preferred beyond the fact that it is tradition.
From a Christian standpoint, perhaps the strongest
argument to be made in favor of the traditional view is that the
Bible and human experience appear to favor and encourage
committed and loving opposite-gender relationships over equally
committed and loving same-gender ones. 50 While it is true that
Jesus never explicitly commented on same-gender relationships,
he spoke favorably about opposite-gender marriages.51  As
theological ethicist Lisa Sowle Cahill contends, "[both biblical
and nonbiblical] sources together point toward the privileging of
a heterosexual model or ideal for human sexuality."52 Indeed,
even theologians who believe that same-sex intercourse is not
inherently sinful find no positive affirmations of such activity in
together and had all things in common; they would sell their property and
possessions and divide them among all according to each one's need.").
50 One popular, although easily refutable, argument raised is that extending the
right of marriage to gays will weaken family life. Aside from the fact that gay
marriage would legitimize gay and lesbian families, and hence, strengthen families
overall, one should consider instead the disease of "affluenza" or the ready
availability of heterosexual divorce as equally important, although not equally
condemned, causes of family and marital strife. See, e.g., JOHN DE GRAAF ET AL.,
AFFLUENZA: THE ALL-CONSUMING EPIDEMIC 66-67 (2001) (noting that Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) has an inverse relationship with the social health index).
51 See, e.g., Matthew 19:4-5 (quoting Jesus as saying, "Have you not read that
from the beginning the Creator 'made them male and female,' and said, 'For this
reason a man will leave his father and mother and be joined to his wife, and the two
shall become one flesh'?").
52 Lisa Sowle Cahill, Homosexuality: A Case Study in Moral Argument, in
HOMOSEXUALITY IN THE CHURCH: BOTH SIDES OF THE DEBATE, supra note 33, at 72.
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the Bible. 53  This evidence certainly would justify churches
limiting the sacrament of marriage to opposite-gender couples.
But because marriage has a legal meaning in addition to its
ecclesiastical definition, it may be important to reconsider the
implications of tying church marriages to civil ones. Specifically,
our state and federal governments bestow upon married couples
a myriad of pecuniary benefits (think of tax and inheritance
implications, for instance)54 that seek to encourage heterosexual
couples to commit to loving, monogamous relationships
consistent with biblical tradition. 55 While few, if any, likely
marry to take advantage of these benefits, the effect of denying
them to loving, committed, monogamous gay and lesbian couples
constitutes official government discrimination. Evangelical
leader Tony Campolo, himself opposed to altering the traditional
definition of marriage, proposes that perhaps the solution should
be to sever the union between church and state on the issue of
marriage. 56 As Jim Wallis explains the argument, "Clergy should
no longer pronounce marriage blessings 'by the authority vested
in me by the State of Pennsylvania.' "57 Campolo's compromise
would not only further the constitutional norm of equal
protection under the law, but it would also promote the
53 See, e.g., Mark McClain-Taylor, But Isn't "It" a Sin?, in HOMOSEXUALITY AND
CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY 76 (Choon-Leong Seow ed., 1996) ("The ambiguity here is
not simply that the Bible says both a yes and a no to homosexual practice. There is
no clear yes, that I know of, and any such claims that scripture affirms what we
know today as homosexual orientation would be anachronistic and strained at
best.").
54 In the first major case involving gay rights during the 1990s, the Hawaiian
Supreme Court in Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), outlined fourteen
benefits that married couples were afforded under state law that were limited to
opposite-gender couples only. Id. at 59. Federal benefits from marriage are even
more numerous; one advocacy group estimates the total of federal and state
marriage benefits to number over a thousand. See Lambda Legal, Why Marriage
Equality Matters, available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/news/
fact.html?record=873 (last visited on June 21, 2006) ("Not only does [marriage] bring
the stability of a committed relationship, but also more than 1,138 automatic federal
and additional state protections, benefits and responsibilities designed to support
and protect family life.").
55 As of this writing, only Massachusetts permits both same- and opposite-
gender marriages. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961, 969
(Mass. 2003) (holding that the State's equal protection requirement mandates that
marriage be afforded to same-sex couples).
56 See JIM WALLIS, GOD'S POLITICS: WHY THE RIGHT GETS IT WRONG AND THE
LEFT DOESN'T GET IT 334 (2005).
57 Id.
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autonomy of churches and churchgoers to exercise their religious
rights as they see fit.58  Most important, from a Christian
perspective, the proposal creates a public space for celebrating
committed relationships between individuals, regardless of their
sexual orientation.
Still, with all respect to Campolo, I would go a step further
and argue that a more practical solution would be to simply allow
for gay marriage, just as our law and culture has now allowed for
interracial marriage. In Loving v. Virginia,59 the Supreme Court
ruled unconstitutional the state of Virginia's anti-miscegenation
law. 60 To me, Loving is precedent for both a constitutional and
Christian expansion of the definition of marriage. Writing for a
unanimous Court, Chief Justice Warren saw Virginia's desire to
prevent the Lovings from marrying for what it was-an attempt
to "maintain White Supremacy."61 One has to wonder whether
the eighteen states that amended their constitutions to limit the
definition of marriage are consciously preserving "traditional
sexual mores" 62 or unconsciously perpetuating "heterosexual
supremacy," or perhaps both.63 Were it possible to divorce, at
58 Id. I leave open for now the thorny issue of allowing discrimination in
churches that wield de facto societal power and serve as an "old boy network" of
sorts. Should this arise, a strong argument could be made that state intervention
would be necessary to dismantle that network, not unlike requiring private social
clubs to allow women into membership. See, e.g., Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary
Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). In
any event, in a pluralistic society such as ours, we should generally encourage the
separation of churches from the existing power structure, both formal and informal,
not only because such a practice would be consistent with the First Amendment's
Establishment Clause, but also because, from a Christian perspective, we should be
wary of "the [yeast] of the Pharisees"-self-righteous teachings and practices that
perpetuate power differentials rather than serve the downtrodden. See Matthew 16:6
(New American) ("Jesus said to them, 'Look out, and beware of the [yeast] of the
Pharisees and Sadducees.' ").
59 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
60 Id. at 12.
61 Id. at 11.
62 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
63 By drawing the analogy to the "white supremacy" argument in Loving, I do
not assume ill will on the part of Christians whose faith leads them to conclude that
civil marriages should be limited to opposite-sex unions. But neither do I assume
that all white folks who were in favor of segregation during the 1950s and 1960s
acted in bad faith. Instead, I subscribe to the view that, this side of the Fall, we are
all too often blind to how even our best intentions lead to the oppression of others.
Hence, just as we (and our government) can be guilty of unconsciously contributing
to racism, we can also be guilty of unconsciously perpetuating homophobia. See
generally Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
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this late date, the ecclesiastic and governmental conceptions of
marriage from each other, then Campolo's proposal might make
sense. In this day and age, however, not many will be willing to
give up marriage as an institution of the state, and, therefore,
the only pragmatic recourse for Christians sympathetic to Jesus's
call for social justice would be to press for broader definitions of
marriage at both the state and federal levels and perhaps a well-
defined strategy to mount a constitutional attack against more
limited definitions, using Evans and Lawrence as grist for the
mill and the NAACP's strategy in the school desegregation cases
as a model.
I am cautiously optimistic that this alternate view of
Lawrence and its place in the greater movement for social justice
will resonate among more and more Christians. The Christian-
inspired civil rights movement for racial and socioeconomic
justice 64 continues to stand as a shining example of the power of
the gospel to transform lives for the better. While we all know
that race and poverty discrimination continue to plague our
world, we must not despair, but instead patiently and lovingly
stay the course for social justice. The spirit blows where it will,
and hearts and minds will be won one person at a time. Indeed,
if the same Earl Warren, who, as Governor of California, strongly
supported the racially-motivated internment of Japanese-
American citizens during World War 11,65 could later become the
author of such cornerstones of our civil rights jurisprudence as
Loving and Brown v. Board of Education,66 then there is hope for
us all.
To return to the beginning, what does it mean to follow Jesus
and not Caesar in modern America? It means not to express fear
or anger at the Lawrence decision, but instead to embrace it as a
call to social justice for sexual minorities that simultaneously
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 355 (1987) (arguing that
"unconscious racism ... underlies much of the racially disproportionate impact of
governmental policy").
64 Two recent books have highlighted the religious groundings of the movement.
See generally DAVID L. CHAPPELL, A STONE OF HOPE: PROPHETIC RELIGION AND THE
DEATH OF JIM CROW (2004); MARSH, supra note 5.
65 See, e.g., RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 664-65
(Vintage Books 2004) (1976) (describing Warren's initial advocacy in favor of the
internment and his eventual regret).
66 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding unconstitutional the doctrine of "separate but
equal" as applied to public education).
20061
130 JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 45:115
creates space for a renewed conversation about a Christian
sexual ethic that lifts up committed, loving relationships between
people.
